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REPARATION RIGHTS TAX RELIEF RESTORES
HUMAN RIGHTS AS A CIVIL RIGHT IN TAX
TORT REFORM
Professor Laura A. Quigley*†
“[D]amages that aim to substitute for a victim’s physical or
personal well-being-[are] personal assets that the Government
does not tax and would not have taxed had the victim not lost
them.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The 1996 Act Makes Nonphysical Personal Injury, Such as Discrimination
Cases, Taxable
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”) made
damages from discrimination cases taxable, including recoveries for
emotional distress.2 This particular result arose from Congress’s effort to
raise revenue that would offset the provisions to increase the minimum
wage3 and reversed the tax doctrines that the Supreme Court, the
Treasury Department, and Congress itself had established from 1918–
1996. Even as he signed the 1996 Act into law, President Clinton noted
his reservations about the revenue offset provision in a comment that
summarizes the heart of the problem: “Such damages are paid to
compensate for injury, whether physical or not, and are designed to
make victims whole, not to enrich them. These damages should not be
considered a source of taxable income.”4
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1
O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 86 (1996).
2
Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§ 104(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996)) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2002)).
3
Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1928–29 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§ 104(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996)) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2002)).
4
President’s Signing Statement, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1475 (Aug. 26, 1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1862–64.
*
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In analyzing the 1996 Act’s taxation of emotional distress recoveries
in discrimination cases, this Article finds that Congress overstepped its
constitutional authority by making these emotional distress recoveries an
item of income.
By conducting a review of the legislative,
administrative, constitutional, and judicial history of gross income and
the exclusion from income for personal injuries and reparation rights tax
relief, this Article shows that emotional distress recoveries are not items
of income and cannot be taxed. This Article also explains that the
taxation of emotional distress recoveries under the 1996 Act originated
from the tension between the civil rights movement and tort reform.
B.

Overview of Parts II–VI

Part II of this Article focuses on the legislation and legislative history
of §§ 61(a) and 104(a)(2) as they relate to dignitary torts. This Part
establishes that the meaning of income is a constitutional concept, not a
statutory concept.
Part III of this Article then combines the
administrative history of personal injury recoveries and reparation rights
recoveries. This Part emphasizes the similarities between personal injury
and reparation rights recoveries to indicate that both types of recoveries
are not income.
Part IV of this Article concentrates on the unconstitutional aspects of
taxing emotional distress recoveries as income items. This Part shows,
under the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis, that emotional distress
recoveries are not income and that a tax on these recoveries is a
capitation or direct tax. Part V of this Article reviews the tension
between the civil rights movement and tort reform. This Part displays
the inconsistent treatment of emotional distress recoveries by tort
reformers, who limit these recoveries as noneconomic damages while
Congress taxes these recoveries as economic damages.
Part VI of this Article concludes that legislative, administrative, and
judicial history indicate precedent supporting the conclusion that, under
a variety of tax doctrines, emotional distress recoveries, like reparation
rights recoveries, are not income items in the constitutional sense. These
tax doctrines concern the legal concepts of the return of human capital,
the reimbursement for the loss of personal or civil rights, the “in lieu of”
test, and horizontal equity. Under each of these tax doctrines, the taxing
of emotional distress recoveries as income is unconstitutional. Finally,
this Part shows how excluding emotional distress recoveries from
income in nonphysical personal injuries would help to eliminate the
English common law sexual stereotypes surrounding mental injuries’
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lack of importance, end the inconsistent tax treatment of these recoveries
based on the distinction between physical and nonphysical injuries, stop
the dual treatment of these recoveries as noneconomic damages under
tort reform but as economic damages for tax purposes, and merge the
interests of human rights’ and civil rights’ advocates and tort reformers.
II. DIGNITARY TORTS AND THE LEGISLATION AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
§§ 61(A) AND 104(A)(2)
A. The Meaning of Income is a Constitutional Concept, Not a Statutory
Concept
The Internal Revenue Code sets forth an expansive concept of gross
income, which is subject to the limits of the U.S. Constitution. As the
House and Senate Reports state: “Section 61(a) provides that gross
income includes ‘all income from whatever source derived.’ This
definition is based upon the 16th Amendment and the word ‘income’ is
used in its constitutional sense.”5
The definition of gross income has undergone very little legislative
change from its inception to the present. Originally, § 213(a) of 1918 and
subsequently § 22(a) of 1939 provided that all gain, profits, and income
derived from any source whatever are income subject to taxation.6
Section 61 of 1954, now § 61(a) as promulgated in 1986, still provides that
“gross income means all income from whatever source derived . . . .”7
B. Until the 1996 Act, the Exclusion from Income Included Physical and
Nonphysical Personal Injuries and Sickness, Such as Dignitary Torts
The legislative history behind the exclusion from income statute,
§ 104(a)(2), was silent as to whether personal injuries or sickness
exempted physical and nonphysical personal injuries and sickness until

5
H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at A 18 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4155; S. REP.
NO. 83-1622, at 168 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4802; see also Rutkin v.
United States, 343 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1952) (stating that the full exercise by Congress of its
income taxing power refers just to the Sixteenth Amendment); Merchants’ Loan & Trust
Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519–20 (1921); James Edward Maule, Gross Income: Overview
and Conceptual Aspects, 501-2nd TAX MGM’T, A-1, A-4 (2002).
6
Internal Revenue Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-1, § 22(a), 53 Stat. 9 (1939) (codified at
I.R.C. § 22(a) (1939)); Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065
(1919) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1918)).
7
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 61(a), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 2085
(codified at I.R.C. § 61(a) (1986)); see also 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2002); Internal Revenue Code of
1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 61, 68A Stat. 17 (1954) (codified at I.R.C. § 61 (1954)).
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1996.8 In 1996, the legislative history discussed the explicit changes that
were expected when nonphysical personal injuries and nonphysical
sickness became taxable and when emotional distress was not
considered a physical injury or physical sickness.9
“Thus, the exclusion from gross income does not apply to any
damages received (other than for medical expenses as discussed below)
based on a claim of employment discrimination or injury to reputation
accompanied by a claim of emotional distress.”10 The legislative history
also broadly defined emotional distress to include symptoms, such as
insomnia, headaches, and stomach disorders, that result from the
emotional distress.11
This bifurcation by Congress of personal injuries and sickness into
physical and nonphysical injuries signifies a departure from almost
eighty years of legislative, administrative, and judicial guidance. On its
surface, this departure might appear to conform to reparation rights tax
relief,12 which generally originated from a physical loss. However, on
closer inspection in Parts III.A, III.B, and IV.D, the change that makes
emotional distress recoveries subject to tax departs radically from the
constitutional safeguards of dignitary torts, such as reparation rights and
civil rights discrimination cases, which encompass emotional distress
recoveries as reimbursement for infringement of civil or personal
rights.13
The pertinent exclusion from gross income underwent very little
change from 1918–1996. Section 213(b)(6) of 1918 and then § 22(b)(5) of
1939 stated that gross income does not include “amounts received, through
accident or health insurance or under workmen’s compensation acts, as
compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any
damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or
sickness.”14 From 1954 through mid-1996, § 104(a)(2) stated that gross

H.R. REP. NO. 767, at 9, 10, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 92 (1918).
Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§ 104(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996)); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300–02 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1792–94.
10
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-737, at 301 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1793.
11
See id., reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1793 n.56.
12
See infra text accompanying notes 20, 26.
13
See infra text accompanying notes 20, 26.
14
Internal Revenue Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-1, § 22(b)(5), 53 Stat. 10 (1939) (codified at
I.R.C. § 22(b)(5) (1939)) (emphasis added); Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254,
§ 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6) (1918)).
8
9
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income does not include “the amount of any damages received (whether by
suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness.”15
Then in 1996, Congress changed § 104(a)(2) to state that gross income
does not include:
“[T]he amount of any damages (other than punitive damages)
received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump
sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal physical
injuries or physical sickness;” . . . “For purposes of paragraph
(2), emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury
or physical sickness. . . .” 16
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF PERSONAL INJURY AND REPARATION
RIGHTS RECOVERIES
A. The Treasury Department Did Not Consider Physical or Nonphysical
Personal Injury Recoveries To Be Income Under a Return of Human
Capital Concept
Originally, the Treasury Department taxed accident insurance
proceeds and damage awards for pain and suffering as income from
1915–1918.17 Then, the Attorney General issued an opinion regarding the
phrase “gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever,”
and concluded that accident insurance proceeds “merely take the place
of capital in human ability which was destroyed by the accident . . . [and
are] ‘capital’ as distinguished from ‘income’ receipts.”18 The Treasury
Department followed this opinion by finding that accident insurance
proceeds or amounts received for personal injuries in accidents were not
income from 1918–1922.19
Subsequently, a Solicitor’s opinion in 1922 held that nonphysical
personal injury recoveries, such as the alienation of affection recoveries,
15
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 104(a)(2), 68A Stat. 30 (1954)
(codified at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1954)) (emphasis added).
16
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2002) (emphasis added); § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838.
17
T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39, 42 (1915). The Treasury Department, Office of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ruled that money paid by an accident insurance policy
on account of accidents was gross income. It further ruled that damages received for pain
and suffering were income. As such, the damages would be taxable as “‘gains or profits
and income derived from any source whatever.’” See also T.D. 2690, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev.
126 (1918) (promulgating Treas. Reg. § 33, revised, pt. I, at 130 (1918)).
18
31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 308 (1918).
19
See generally T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918) (revoking Regulations No.
33, revised, that were inconsistent with the 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 308 (1918)).
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were not income.20 This opinion did not apply the exclusion from
income, § 213(b)(6), the predecessor of § 104(a)(2),21 because “the
question is really more fundamental, namely, whether such damages are
within the legal definition of income.”22
The author agrees with the 1922 Solicitor’s opinion and contends that
logic requires that an item must first be income before it can become
taxable income. Thus, an item that is not income does not need to rely
on an exclusion from income provision to avoid taxation. Because a
nonphysical personal injury recovery is not an income item, it also does
not need to rely on an exclusion from income statute to avoid the tax on
income.
The Treasury Department again followed this 1922 Solicitor’s
opinion by finding that nonphysical personal injury recoveries, being a
loss of personal rights, were not income.23 Specifically, the Treasury
Department stated that “a promise to marry is a personal right not
susceptible of any appraisal in relation to market values and . . . damages
. . . [for] the invasion of such right [do] not constitute taxable income.”24
20
See generally Sol. Op. 132-I-1 C.B. 92 (1922) (modifying Solicitor’s Memorandum 957
and revoking Solicitor’s Memorandum 1384). Upon the request of the Treasury, Congress
enacted § 213(b)(6) as part of the Revenue Act of 1918, which excluded from gross income
amounts received for personal injuries or sickness. The legislative history was silent as to
whether personal injuries or sickness exempted physical and nonphysical personal injuries
and sickness. H.R. REP. NO. 767, 65th Cong. 2d Sess. at 9–10, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 92
(1918). This silence led to Solicitor’s Memorandum 1384, which decided that personal
injuries meant physical injuries only. Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920). The Solicitor, using
the § 213(b)(6) exclusion, then determined that the alienation of a wife’s affection was
taxable. Even though it was found to be a personal injury, it was not a physical injury, did
not constitute capital, and was not due to sickness. In 1922, the Solicitor was again
confronted with the issue of whether alienation of affection, slander or libel of personal
character, and surrender of custody of a minor child were excludable from income. This
opinion did not base its decision on the § 213(b)(6) exclusion from income, but focused on
the meaning of income to find that these personal nonphysical injury claims are not
income. Id.
21
See 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2002); § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838–39; § 104(a)(2), 68A Stat. 30;
Internal Revenue Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-1, § 22(b)(5), 53 Stat. 10 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 22(b)(5) (1939)); § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919).
22
Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922); see also Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920)
(holding that a pure stock dividend is not taxed because it is not income, and stating the
legal definition of income as “gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 906 (4th ed. 1968) (defining income); infra text
accompanying note 88.
23
I.T. 1804, II-2 C.B. 61, 62 (1923).
24
Id. The Treasury Department made this decision based upon Solicitor’s Opinion 132,
supra note 20, and Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207 (stating that the legal definition of income is
“gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined”).
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The Treasury Department continued this same theme with reparation
rights in 1928, finding that an award paid in accordance with the
Settlement of War Claims Act for the loss of life “is not embraced in the
general concept of the term ‘income.’”25
B. The Treasury Department Finds that Personal Injury and Reparation
Payments Are Not Income Because They Are a Reimbursement for the Loss
of Civil or Personal Rights
The Treasury Department revenue rulings from the 1950s through
the early 1990s, as a general rule, continued to hold that personal injury
payments and reparation payments were not income.26 The Treasury
25
I.T. 2420, VII-2 C.B. 123, 124 (1928). The Treasury Department referenced the § 213(a)
definition of income that all gains, profits, and income derived from any source whatever
are income subject to taxation. However, this compensation was not income and thus not
taxable because it restored the taxpayer to substantially the same financial and economic
status as she possessed prior to the death of her husband. Id.
26
See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432–33 (1955) (holding punitive
damages to be taxable gross income); Hawkins v. Comm’r, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1025 (1928), acq.,
C.B. VII-1, 14 (finding that compensatory damages for injury to personal reputation were
not income). See generally Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179 (holding that compensation for
the loss of life under a state wrongful death statute is not embraced in the general concept
of the term income, and citing I.T. 2420, supra note 25, and § 22(a) (successor to § 213(a)
used in I.T. 2420)). Both sections provided that all gains, profits, and income derived from
any source whatever are income subject to taxation. Id. See also generally Rev. Rul. 85-98,
1985-2 C.B. 51 (superseding Rev. Rul. 58-418, reaffirming that libel recoveries for injury to
personal reputation are excludable, citing § 61, but using the § 104(a)(2) exclusion from
gross income and finding punitive damages to be includible in gross income); Rev. Rul. 74205, 1974-1 C.B. 21 (extending Rev. Rul. 63-136, Rev. Rul. 68-38, and Rev. Rul. 72-340 to
replacement housing payments made under legislatively provided social benefit programs
for promotion of the general welfare); Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33 (superseding Sol. Op.
132, reaffirming that damages for alienation of affections and for surrender of the custody
of minor child are not income because they relate to personal or family rights, not property
rights, and citing § 61, but obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 98-37 due to the 1996 Act amending
§ 104(a)(2)); Rev. Rul. 72-340, 1972-2 C.B. 31 (extending Rev. Rul. 63-136 for stipends paid to
probationers to aid in acquiring training); Rev. Rul. 69-212, 1969-1 C.B. 34 (extending Rev.
Rul. 58-370 to a widow’s pension); Rev. Rul. 68-38, 1968-1 C.B. 446 (extending Rev. Rul. 63136 to a training program on an Indian reservation); Rev. Rul. 63-136, 1963-2 C.B. 19
(finding that benefit payments for training are not includible in gross income because they
are similar to other unemployment relief payments made for the promotion of the general
welfare, citing § 61, I.T. 3230, 1938-2 C.B. 136; Rev. Rul. 55-562, 1955-2 C.B. 21; and Rev. Rul.
57-102, 1957-1 C.B. 26); Rev. Rul. 58-500, 1958-2 C.B. 21 (extending Rev. Rul. 56-518 as
clarified by Rev. Rul. 57-505); Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18 (holding that compensatory
damages for libel and slander resulting in injury to personal reputation are excludable from
gross income, citing § 61); Rev. Rul. 58-370, 1958-2 C.B. 14 (extending Rev. Rul. 56-518 and
Rev. Rul. 57-505 for Nazi persecution, and restating that these payments are in the nature
of reimbursement for deprivation of civil or personal rights, citing § 61); Rev. Rul. 56-518,
1956-2 C.B. 25 (clarified by Rev. Rul. 57-505, 1957-2 C.B. 50) (extending Rev. Rul. 55-132 to
U.S. citizens or residents for Nazi persecution, citing § 61, the successor to § 22(a), and
providing that “gross income means all income from whatever source derived . . . .”)); Rev.
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Department based these rulings on the definition of gross income
§§ 213(a), 22(a), 61, and 61(a), which define gross income. It did not base
the rulings on §§ 213(b)(6), 22(b)(5), and 104(a)(2), which set forth
exclusions from income. Due to this, the Treasury Department found
that such payments are a reimbursement for the loss of civil or personal
rights and thus did not meet the definition of income.27 The author
asserts, as stated in Part II.A, that if these payments are not income, they
do not need exclusion from income statutes to avoid becoming taxable
income.
For example, payments received by an American Prisoner of War
were not includible in gross income, as they were merely reimbursement
for the loss of personal rights.28 Similarly, payments received for Nazi
persecution were not includible in income, as they constituted
reimbursement for the loss of personal rights or civil rights.29
These rulings used the definition of income under Hawkins v.
Commissioner30 and the currently accepted, redefined, and broader
definition of income of the U.S. Supreme Court under Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co.,31 which referred to increases to wealth.32 Even using
the most expansive definition of income, these rulings concluded that
recoveries for all nonphysical injuries should not be items of income,
thus negating the need to be excluded from income.33
C. Under the “In Lieu Of” Test, Payments Substituting for Actual Earnings
are Income but Payments Substituting for Personal Assets Are Not Income
In 1972, the IRS found a Title VII discrimination claim to be income
under § 61 because the amount paid was actual earnings.34 This ruling
Rul. 56-462, 1956-2 C.B. 20 (extending Rev. Rul. 54-19 to payments to Korean War
prisoners); Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213 (holding that amounts received by an
American Prisoner of War are in the nature of reimbursement for the loss of personal rights
and are not includible in gross income, citing again to § 22(a)).
27
See supra note 26.
28
Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213; see also supra text accompanying note 26.
29
Rev. Rul. 58-370, 1958-2 C.B. 14; see also supra text accompanying note 26.
30
6 B.T.A. at 1023 (finding that personal reputation damages are compensatory and thus
not income).
31
348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (stating that exemplary damages are income and defining
income as “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized”).
32
Id.
33
See supra notes 20, 26 and accompanying text.
34
See generally Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32 (amplified by Rev. Rul. 84-92, 1984-1 C.B.
204 to include compensation for the Railroad Retirement Tax Act and holding that
payments to employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for lost earnings
were gross income under § 61).
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relied on the “in lieu of” test, discussed in the U.S. Supreme Court case
of Hort v. Commissioner,35 which looked to the nature of the item for
which the damages were a substitute.36 Conversely, under the “in lieu
of” test, also discussed in the U.S. Supreme Court case O’Gilvie v. United
States,37 emotional distress recoveries are not income because the
government does not tax the reimbursement of something that would
not otherwise be taxed.38
D. Taxpayers Used the Exclusion From Income Statute, Not the Definition of
Income Statute, in Support of Their Cases
Taxpayers used the exclusion from income §§ 22(b)(5) and 104(a)(2)
in their cases rather than showing that their recoveries were not income
under § 61(a), the definition of income.39 These taxpayers used the
exclusion from income provision at first because the exclusion from
income statute granted them specific relief from taxation, or, as seen
below, because their recoveries were items of income that needed a
specific exclusion from income statute to avoid taxation. Due to this, the

313 U.S. 28 (1941).
Id. at 32 (using the “in lieu of” test to find income because the cancellation of a lease
was essentially a substitute for rental payments).
37
519 U.S. 79 (1996).
38
Id. at 86 (finding that punitive damages were not excludable from income). The Court
in O’Gilvie reviewed the history of the personal injury exclusion as based on a decision not
to tax “damages that, making up for a loss, seek to make a victim whole . . . .” Id.; see also
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 432 n.8 (“The long history of departmental rulings holding
personal injury recoveries nontaxable [is based] on the theory that they roughly correspond
to a return of capital . . . .”).
39
See also Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55 (not following Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F. 2d
693 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’g Roemer v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 398 (1982) (excluding libel suit
recoveries under § 104(a)(2) as personal, and finding that a predominantly business and
professional libel suit recovery is not excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2)); Rev.
Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32 (revoking Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47 and finding that
wrongful death statutes where only punitive damages are recoverable are includible in
gross income, but if the state’s statute provides that no punitive damages are recoverable,
then recovery is excludable from gross income under the exclusion from income
§ 104(a)(2)); supra text accompanying note 26. See generally Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 C.B. 51;
Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50 (amplifying Rev. Rul. 61-1 and stating that lost wages paid
as damages for a personal injury sustained in an accident are excludable from gross income
under § 104(a)(2)); Rev. Rul. 61-1, 1961-1 C.B. 14 (holding that a railroad employee’s
settlement for personal injuries is not includible in gross income, even for the amount
apportioned to time lost under the exclusion from income § 104(a)(2)); Rev. Rul. 103, 1953-1
C.B. 20 (advising that employer disability payments that are not a health or accident
insurance plan in excess of workmen’s compensation are includible in gross income, unless
made by the employer for personal injuries or sickness in satisfaction of a tort or tort-type
liability, under the exclusion from income § 22(b)).
35
36
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Treasury Department and courts began basing their decisions and
rulings on the statutory interpretation of this exclusion.40
The U.S. Supreme Court cases of United States v. Burke41 and
Commissioner v. Schleier42 arose from discrimination statutes that allowed
remedies for back pay or liquidated damage recoveries but provided no
relief for emotional distress recoveries.43 In both cases, the parties based
their arguments on the exclusion from income statute, § 104(a)(2).44 In
each of these cases, the taxpayers conceded that their discrimination case
recoveries for back pay or liquidated damages were income items.45 This
appears to be a logical concession because these payments substituted
for actual earnings or were considered windfalls under the “in lieu of”
test, analyzed under Part III.C.
The Burke decision in 1992 discussed in dictum the tort-like nature of
the remedies provided under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which also
allowed compensatory damages for emotional distress and punitive
damages in marked contrast to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
allowed only back pay damages.46 Following this dictum, in 1993 the
IRS held that compensatory damages, including back pay for claims of
disparate employment discrimination, were excluded from gross income
as tort-like damages for personal injury under § 104(a)(2).47 Then, the
Schleier decision in 1995 found no exclusion from tax for an age
discrimination case’s limited remedies of back pay and liquidated
damages. Based on this decision, the IRS suspended their 1993 ruling to
invite public comment.48
In 1996, the IRS ultimately abrogated their 1993 discrimination
ruling49 in light of § 104(a)(2), as amended by § 1605 of the 1996 Act.50
The IRS acknowledged that the amended § 104(a)(2) restricted the
exclusion from gross income to physical personal injuries or sickness and

40
See Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 234
(1992); Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-2 C.B. 6; Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61; Notice 95-45, 1995-2
C.B. 330.
41
504 U.S. 229 (1992).
42
515 U.S. 323 (1995).
43
Schleier, 515 U.S. at 323; Burke, 504 U.S. at 229.
44
Schleier, 515 U.S. at 323; Burke, 504 U.S. at 229.
45
See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 328; Burke, 504 U.S. at 233.
46
Burke, 504 U.S. at 241.
47
Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61.
48
Schleier, 515 U.S. at 323; see also Notice 95-45, 1995-2 C.B. 330.
49
Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-2 C.B. 6.
50
26 U.S.C. § 104 (a)(2) (2002).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss1/2

Quigley: Reparation Rights Tax Relief Restores Human Rights as a Civil Rig

2005]

Reparation Rights Tax Relief

51

provided that emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury
or physical sickness.51
This 1996 ruling decided that back pay was not excluded from gross
income as disparate treatment employment discrimination under the
former § 104(a)(2) because it was not received due to personal injuries or
sickness.52 However, prior to the 1996 Act, the IRS still found that
emotional distress recoveries were excluded when received on account
of personal injuries or sickness under the former § 104(a)(2), Burke, and
Schleier.53
The distinction made by the IRS between back pay and emotional
distress recoveries displays the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation in
both Burke and Schleier: Recoveries for emotional distress qualify for the
former § 104(a)(2) exclusion from income because when viewed in
isolation, they stem from a tort-type right and result from a personal
injury.54 This distinction also highlights the constitutional aspect of
emotional distress recoveries as not being income, which Part IV below
discusses further.
E. Reparation Rights Tax Relief Should Guide Congress Back to Civil Rights
Tax Relief
Reparation rights and discrimination cases have both a human rights
and a civil rights component. Human rights embody the freedoms and
benefits all human beings should be able to claim as a matter of right in
their society at an international level.55 Civil rights entail the rights of
personal liberty guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution as well as U.S.
legislation.56
Thus, violations of the U.S. discrimination statutes cause a violation
of both human rights and civil rights. These human rights and civil

Id.
Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-2 C.B. 6.
53
Id.; see also Schleier, 515 U.S. at 332; Burke, 505 U.S. at 241; Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B.
61; Douglas A. Kahn, Taxation of Damages After Schleier—Where are We and Where Do We Go
From Here?, 15 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 305, 330 (1995) (“If the ADEA had allowed damages to
be awarded for pain and suffering, and if that added item were deemed sufficient to make
a claim under the ADEA a tort or tort-type claim, then damages received by the taxpayer
for pain and suffering would be received on account of a personal injury, and so would be
excluded from income.”) (citation omitted).
54
See supra note 53.
55
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 758 (8th ed. 2004) (defining human rights).
56
Id. at 263 (8th ed. 2004) (defining civil rights).
51
52
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rights violations cross more than one generation because they stem from
social upheaval and longterm suffering.57
The 1996 Act’s statutory shift limits the exclusion from tax to
physical personal injury and sickness, thereby taxing nonphysical
personal injury and sickness, which includes emotional distress
recoveries in discrimination cases. This shift represents a narrowing of
our legislature’s former humanitarianism policy.58 In contrast, instances
of America’s reparation tax relief for POWs,59 the Holocaust,60 9-11
victims,61 and the proposed African-American reparation legislation for
Mark J. Wolff, Sex, Race, and Age: Double Discrimination in Torts and Taxes, 78 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1341, 1344 (2000). Mr. Wolff stated:
[T]oday physicians, lawyers, and social scientists acknowledge that
nonphysical injuries resulting from racial discrimination cause
enduring intergenerational scars and may be more enduring and more
severe than physical injuries caused by the loss of an arm or leg in a
traffic accident.
Additionally, both empirical studies and
congressional policies now recognize the insidiousness of sexual
harassment, age, and disability discrimination, as well as the long-term
and sometimes permanently debilitating effects inflicted upon their
victims.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Karen B. Brown, Not Color-Or-Gender-Neutral: New Tax
Treatment of Employment Discrimination Damages, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 223,
231 (1998) (“The result is codification of the notion that an injury to the physical part of an
individual is real and tangible and, hence, legally perceptible. . . . Harm to an individual in
the form of employment discrimination is not cognizable because it is not real (imaginary,
not traceable to a cause), and it is intangible (incapable of measurement).”); Kahn, supra
note 53, at 318. Mr. Kahn surmised:
On the other hand, the case for excluding damages received for
nonphysical injuries (other perhaps than for mental damage) is less
compelling.
The plight of a person who suffers exclusively
nonphysical injuries does not arouse the same degree of sympathy that
attaches to a victim who suffers a serious physical injury.
Id.; Harold S. Peckron, Reparation Payments—An Exclusion Revisited, 34 U.S.F.L. REV. 705
(2000).
58
Wolff, supra note 57, at 1401; see also Kahn, supra note 53, at 316.
59
See supra text accompanying note 26.
60
Id.; see also Holocaust Restitution Tax Fairness Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-358, § 2, 116
Stat. 3015 (2002) (repealing the sunset of section 901); Peckron, supra note 57 at 705. See
generally Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 803, 115 Stat. 149 (2001) (excluding from federal income tax restitution received by
victims of Nazi regime).
61
See 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(5) (2002); see also John M. Barkett, Combating Terrorism in the
Environmental Trenches: Terrorism and the Future of Torts; If Terror Reigns, Will Torts Follow?,
9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 485, 543 (2003); Hillel Sommer, Providing Compensation for Harm
Caused by Terrorism: Lessons Learned in the Israeli Experience, 36 IND. L. REV. 335, 365 (2003).
See generally Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, §§ 101-116,
115 Stat. 2427 (2002) (providing income tax and estate tax relief to 9-11 victims and anthrax
victims); Elbert Lin, Case Comment, Korematsu Continued . . . , 112 YALE L.J. 1911, 1913
57
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slavery62 demand that Congress reinstate tax relief for civil rights cases
to reinforce America’s human rights resolve.
Tax doctrine indicates that reparations in the form of recoveries for
the taking of human rights or civil rights are not income because they are
a reimbursement for the loss of personal or civil rights.63 Using this tax
doctrine, recoveries for the taking of human rights in reparation cases
and personal or civil rights in personal injury and discrimination cases
are not income.64
IV. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TAXING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
RECOVERIES
A. The Tax History of the U.S. Constitution
The focus of America’s revolution and the break with Britain was
taxation, as shown in the well-known phrase allowing no taxation
without representation.65 America’s first constitution, the Articles of
Confederation, failed to provide enforcement powers for the national

(2003) (comparing Pearl Harbor with 9-11 as signifying losses of personal rights by using
“threats to national security to deflect attention from race-based actions”).
62
See also Tuneen E. Chisolm, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door: Examining the
Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 727 n.56 (1999)
(citing Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African Americans Act, H.R. 40,
105th Cong., § 2(b) (1997), which “propos[ed] to establish a commission to examine the
institution of slavery . . . and the impact of these experiences on living African
Americans . . . ”); Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts? Righting the Wrongs of Slavery, 89
GEO. L.J. 2531 (2001); Van B. Luong, Recent Development: Political Interest Convergence:
African American Reparations and the Image of American Democracy, 25 HAW. L. REV. 253, 258
(2002); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American
Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477, 523 n.36 (1998) (referring to a section of the article “describing
the reframing of reparations from compensation to ‘repair’—that is, the repairing of tears in
the structural and psychological fabric of a society resulting from the social and economic
subordination of some of its members”). See generally African American Reparations
Commission Act, H.R. 40, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by Rep. John Conyers from 1989
forward).
63
See supra Part III.B.
64
See supra Part III.B.
65
See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS § 327.7 (16th ed., 1992) (noting the phrase
“taxation without representation is tyranny” was attributed to James Otis in 1763); Bruce
Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1999) (“During the
revolutionary era, taxation was at the very center of popular consciousness. The break
with Britain was motivated largely by this issue . . . .”).
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government to raise revenue from the states.66 The Federalists’ solution
was the broad grant of power to Congress to impose and collect taxes.67
Thus, the U.S. Constitution gave Congress broad powers of taxation,
but this power was subject to an important income taxation limit. This
constitutional limit directed that no capitation or other direct tax shall be
imposed, unless in proportion to the census or apportioned among the
several states.68
Three reasons have been proposed for this limitation. First, there
was a desire to limit the national government’s taxation powers to
protect private rights from oppressive taxation.69 Second, it was
important to protect state and local governments’ rights to raise revenues
through direct taxes, like real estate taxes.70 Third, the limitation arose
from the Great Compromise, which Benjamin Franklin proposed. The
compromise espoused equal representation in the Senate and
proportional representation in the House.71
Acceptance of this
compromise led to the South’s insistence on counting their slaves as
three-fifths of a person in order to obtain greater representation in the
House in exchange for paying an extra three-fifths share of direct taxes.72

See Ackerman, supra note 65, at 6.
See Ackerman, supra note 65, at 5. The general taxing power and the uniformity rule
provides: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises, shall be uniform throughout the United
States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
68
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, amended by U.S. CONST. amend.
XVI. The direct tax clauses provide:
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to
the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken. . . . The
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration. . . .
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union, according to
their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to service for a
Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other
Persons.
Id.
69
See F. Patrick Hubbard, Making People Whole Again: The Constitutionality of Taxing
Compensatory Tort Damages For Mental Distress, 49 FLA. L. REV. 725, 729 (1997).
70
See id. at 730.
71
See Ackerman, supra note 65, at 8.
72
Id.
66
67
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If the Great Compromise to slavery were the only reason for this
limit, as some commentators contend, then a narrow reading of the
direct tax clause as applying only to real estate or poll taxes may be
warranted.73 However, if the concerns about oppressive taxation and
protecting the state and local governments’ rights to raise revenue
through direct taxes were also considerations that resulted in the
limitation, then prohibition against all capitation and direct taxes is still
important today.74
Frederick Douglass stated his view that all the reasons were relevant:
I hold that the Federal Government was never, in its
essence, anything but an anti-slavery government.
Abolish slavery tomorrow, and not a sentence or syllable
of the Constitution need be altered. It was purposely
framed as to give no claim, no sanction to the claim, of
property in man. If in its origin slavery had any relation
to the government, it was only as the scaffolding to the
magnificent structure, to be removed as soon as the
building was completed.75
B. An Emotional Distress Recovery Tax Under the 1996 Act Is a Direct
Tax/Capitation Tax
Even those commentators who would view the direct tax
apportionment clause narrowly still concede that a capitation type of tax
is of equal vitality today.76 A capitation tax has been defined as a direct
tax, which is based on the simple fact of a person’s existence.77
See id. at 53, 56; Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up In the
Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 71, 72 (1998).
74
See Hubbard, supra note 69, at 730.
75
Frederick Douglass, Address for the Promotion of Colored Enlistments (July 6, 1983), in
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 365 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950); see also Erik
M. Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution: How to Read the Direct Tax Clauses, 15 J.L. & POL.
687, 706, 714 n.75 (1999); c.f. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 27 (Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (“[I]t is as
though the framers were half-consciously trying to frame two constitutions, one for their
own time and the other for the ages, with slavery viewed bifocally—that is, plainly visible
at their feet, but disappearing when they lifted their eyes.”).
76
See Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 345 (1945) (holding that Congress may tax real
estate or chattels only if the tax is apportioned); see also Ackerman, supra note 65, at 58;
Johnson, supra note 73, at 71, 80.
77
See Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 444 (1868); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (involving a libel action and stating that “actual injury . . .
[includes] . . . mental anguish and suffering”); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 281 (1937),
overruled on another point by Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
73
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Therefore, it is a direct tax imposed on a person, as a person, rather than
imposed on an activity or on real or personal property.78
C. The 1996 Act Failed To Apportion the Emotional Distress Recovery Tax
Under the mechanics of apportionment, State X, which has twice the
population of State Y, would have twice the aggregate liability of State Y.
If an emotional distress recovery tax is apportioned and State X’s per
capita emotional distress awards are only one-half of State Y’s, then the
tax rates on the emotional distress awards in State X would have to be
twice those in State Y to satisfy the apportionment requirement.79 Thus,
emotional distress awards are not apportioned under the 1996 exclusion
from income statute, § 104(a)(2), because such a formula of
apportionment was not included in the 1996 exclusion of income statute.

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 264 (8th ed. 2004) (defining poll-tax and capitation tax); BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 563 (8th ed. 2004) (providing that emotional distress is another term for
the lack of psychic well-being that can also be called numerous names, such as mental
distress, mental anguish, mental suffering, pain and suffering, or a myriad of other
intangible harms); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 737 (8th ed. 2004) (defining health as the
freedom from pain or sickness and the state of being sound or whole in body, mind, or
soul, and the right to the enjoyment of health as a subdivision of the right of personal
security, which is one of the absolute rights of persons); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1347–48
(8th ed. 2004) (defining personal rights as encompassing the rights of personal security, one
of which is health); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 852 (4th ed. 1968); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1137 (4th ed. 1968) (defining the legal meaning of mental as relating to or existing in the
mind; intellectual, emotional, or psychic, as distinguished from bodily or physical);
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1320 (4th ed. 1968); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1488 (4th ed.
1968); Frank J. Doti, Personal Injury Tax Exclusion: An Analysis and Update, 75 DENV. U.L.
REV. 61, 63 (1997) (“From its inception, in my opinion, the exclusion for personal injury
awards should have been limited to losses of human capital. By this I mean any losses to a
person’s birthright—an uninjured body and mind.”); Hubbard, supra note 69, at 760
(stating that “[t]axing each human for the benefits of [or the compensation from not]
possessing and enjoying emotional well-being would be effectively a poll tax [or capitation
tax] because it would be laid upon persons without regard to their occupations or
property,” and emphasizing that psychic well-being is based on the simple fact of a
person’s existence, i.e., their uniquely human mental aspect and is a basic, natural, and
personal right); Nicholas M. Whittington, Against the Grain: An Interdisciplinary Examination
of the 1996 Federal Statutory Changes to the Taxability of Personal Injury Awards, 37 WASHBURN
L.J. 153 (1997); Sharon E. Stedman, Note, Congress’s Amendment to Section 104 of the Tax Code
Will Not Clarify the Tax Treatment of Damages and Will Lead to Arbitrary Distinctions, 21
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 387, 389 (1997).
78
See supra note 77 and accompanying text. But see also infra Part IV.E.
79
Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of
“Incomes”, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1067 (2001).
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D. The 1996 Act’s Taxation of Emotional Distress Recoveries as Income Is
Unconstitutional
To categorize emotional distress recoveries as taxable income, these
recoveries must first be considered income. However, emotional distress
recoveries do not fall within the U.S. Supreme Court’s concept that
income 80 is comprised of undeniable accessions to wealth.81 They also
do not fall within the Internal Revenue Code’s concept of gross income
under § 61(a),82 as all income from whatever source derived.83
The Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution allows Congress
“to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment . . . .”84 This amendment only applies to items of
income.85 Thus, the Sixteenth Amendment does not apply to the taxation
of recoveries meant to compensate a person for emotional distress.
Without the protection of the Sixteenth Amendment, the taxation of
emotional distress recoveries is a capitation or direct tax86 done without
apportionment upon the person who suffers emotional distress, which
violates Article I, section 9 of the U.S. Constitution.87
Income refers to gains or profits, which are true increases in the
amount of wealth.88 To restore the person to the condition in which the
person originally existed89 is not an enrichment that constitutes wealth.
For example, a recovery to compensate a person for emotional distress
does not increase the person’s wealth, but merely restores that person to
his or her previous condition.
As the U.S. Supreme Court recently explained in O’Gilvie,90 tax
policy excludes damages that substitute for “personal assets that the
Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
See id.
82
26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2002).
83
Id.
84
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
85
Id.; see also Hubbard, supra note 69, at 732 (stating that the Sixteenth Amendment
“does not eliminate the apportionment requirement for direct taxes that do not involve
income”).
86
Hubbard, supra note 69, at 760.
87
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see also U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
88
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 778 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining income); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 906 (4th ed. 1968) (defining income).
89
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418–19 (1975) (involving a Title VII
race discrimination claim and stating the make whole concept).
90
O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 86 (1996); see also Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at
432 n.8.
80
81
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government does not tax and would not have taxed had the victim not
lost them.”91 If the government does not tax the joy of life, then
recoveries for the lost joy of life should not be taxed.92 Thus, the current
taxing of emotional distress recoveries under § 104(a)(2) has now
unconstitutionally decreed that: “If you hurt and cry, I’ll tax your
tears.”93
E. An Emotional Distress Recovery Is Not an Income Item in the Statutory
Sense
An emotional distress recovery, if taxed, is best viewed as a
capitation tax on the person.94 Even if an emotional distress recovery tax
is considered a tax on personal property95 or a tax on an activity,96 an

O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 86.
See F. Phillip Manns, Jr., Restoring Tortiously Damaged Human Capital Tax-Free Under
Internal Revenue Code Section 104(a)(2)’s New Physical Injury Requirement, 46 BUFF. L. REV.
347, 349–50 (1998) (“Damage payments are treated identically with the thing for which they
substitute . . . . Similarly, other aspects of living, like the joy of life, are not taxed.
Therefore, damages for lost joy of life should not be taxed either.”). See infra notes 95–101
for a discussion of Mr. Manns’ premise that recoveries from nontaxable items are converted
into taxable items without the exclusion from income statute.
93
Hubbard, supra note 69, at 726.
94
See supra Part IV.B.
95
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1382 (4th ed. 1968); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1254 (8th ed. 2004) (stating that personal property in its broad and general sense is any
movable or intangible thing that is the subject of ownership not in the realm of real estate,
such as a right or interest in things personal); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 143 (1992) (arguing that an emotional distress damage award can be
considered a monetary recovery that creates an economic dimension within a noneconomic
harm by virtue of being granted monetary recoveries for those noneconomic harms). Mr.
Dodge’s article was written before Mr. Hubbard’s article discussing the constitutional
restraints of taxing emotional distress. Mr. Dodge recognizes the “in lieu of” test discussed
in the Supreme Court’s concurring decision in United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 311
(1960), which states: “The principle at work here is that payment which compensates for a
loss of something which would not itself have been an item of gross income is not a taxable
payment.” However, Mr. Dodge counters that test because the tax base must look to the
changes in objective net wealth and be equated with material resources, like money and
property, which can be used by the government. Mr. Dodge has a logical extrapolation to
the argument that if you cry, I will not tax your tears, by including it, but if you receive
money for those tears, then I will tax the money. However, this extension still violates the
court’s tax policy under Kaiser. This extension also does not take into account the duality of
individuals as espoused in United States v. Gilmore, which recognizes that an individual has
two personalities: “[O]ne is [as] a seeker after profit who can deduct the expenses incurred
in that search; the other is [as] a creature satisfying his needs as a human and those of his
family but who cannot deduct such consumption and related expenditures.” 372 U.S. 39,
44 (1963) (quoting SURREY & WARREN, CASES ON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 272 (1960)).
Further, it violates constitutional policy, as demonstrated in Parts IV.A–D, which limits the
tax base and what you can tax without apportionment.
91
92
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emotional distress recovery tax is not a tax on the income from a person,
property, or an activity, because it does not stem from income in the
statutory sense.97
Recovery for emotional distress does not constitute income in the
general statutory sense, as all income from whatever source derived.98
96
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 36, 292, 855 (8th ed. 2004) (“Activity, Common or Joint
Enterprise: An activity is the collective acts of one person or of two or more people in a
common or joint enterprise, which may be defined as a non-commercial joint venture”); see
also Douglas A. Kahn, The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory Damages for Mental
Distress When There Was No Accompanying Physical Injury, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 128, 129 (1999)
(stating that emotional distress damage awards are income, even if emotional distress itself
is not). Mr. Kahn depicts the litigation or settlement aspect leading to an award as
transforming noneconomic harms into an economic or commercial environment. Mr. Kahn
rebuts the unconstitutionality of taxing mental distress by questioning any reliance on the
Pollack or Macomber cases or the return of human capital or noncommercial nature theories,
taking the stance that taxing mental distress recoveries is constitutional. While this Article
acknowledges that the dictionary definition of income in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189,
207 (1920), has been expanded under Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), to include an
economic definition as well, this author uses the Glenshaw Glass Co. and post-Glenshaw Glass
Co. cases’ definition of income and emotional distress to contend that emotional distress
recoveries are not an undeniable accession to wealth. Further, this author uses a narrow
interpretation of Pollock, collectively Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)
(“Pollock I”) and Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (“Pollock II”). A
narrow reading of both Pollock decisions is that the 1894 tax, which the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional, was primarily a tax on income from property, and these two
decisions addressed personal property taxes and real estate taxes as direct taxes requiring
apportionment. The Court also held that if a tax on real estate or personal property is a
direct tax, then it follows that a tax on the income from real estate or invested personal
property is a direct tax. Pollack I, 157 U.S. at 579–83; Pollack II, 158 U.S. at 628, 634. In
reaffirming the Pollock decisions, as modified by Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1,
24–25 (1916), which upheld the progressive income tax passed just after the passage of the
Sixteenth Amendment, this Court said: “Congress may tax real estate or chattels if the tax
is apportioned, and without apportionment it may tax an excise upon a particular use or
enjoyment of property or the shifting from one to another of any power or privilege
incidental to the ownership or enjoyment of property.” Chief Justice Edward White, one of
the four dissenters in the Pollock decisions, wrote the unanimous opinion in Brushaber that
determined that the Sixteenth Amendment only overruled the Pollock decisions’ effort to
trace income back to its underlying asset, and he implied that the Sixteenth Amendment
approved of the Pollock decisions’ expansionary reading of the direct tax clauses to include
capitation taxes and taxes on real estate and personal property, but not to include the
income from real estate or personal property. Finally, this author uses not only a return of
human capital or the noncommercial nature theories, but also utilizes the reparation rights
tax relief analogy that finds a reimbursement for civil or personal rights not to be income.
Thus, an emotional distress recovery is also not income as a reimbursement for a personal
or civil right, which Mr. Kahn did not address. This author further concludes that
intangible harms from all nonphysical injuries recoveries should not be items of income,
thus negating the need to be excluded from income.
97
See § 61(a), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 2085; Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L.
No. 83-591, § 61, 68A Stat. 17 (1954) (codified at I.R.C. § 61 (1954)); see also 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)
(2002).
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Also, an emotional distress recovery does not fit into the statutory gross
income subsections under compensation for services, including fees,
commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items;99 gross income derived
from business;100 or gains derived from dealings in property.101 Rather,
an emotional distress recovery falls under such tax doctrines as a return
of human capital, a reimbursement for the loss of personal or civil rights,
the “in lieu of” test, or horizontal equity.102

See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(1) (2002); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 301 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining compensation to include payment of damages to make the person whole). But see
also Kaiser, 363 U.S. at 310 (“Payment . . . as compensation for a loss or injury that had been
suffered . . . [is] not taxable either because not greater in amount than the loss or because
the thing lost or damaged had no ascertainable market value and so it could not be said
that there had been any net profit to the taxpayer through the effectual exchange of the
thing lost for the payment received.”); supra Part III.C (explaining that compensation in the
form of damages has been limited in case law by the “in lieu of” test).
100
26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(2) (2002); see O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 86 (1996)
(emphasizing that no gain has been received when “damages that, making up for a loss,
seek to make a victim whole, or, speaking very loosely, ‘return the victim’s personal with
financial capital’”); Hubbard, supra note 69, at 763–64 (arguing that emotions do not have
an economic dimension because happiness or sorrow cannot be bought and sold); see also
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 211 (8th ed. 2004) (defining business as a commercial enterprise
carried on for profit, a particular occupation or employment habitually engaged in for
livelihood or gain, commercial transactions, or by extension of a noncommercial nature,
such as the court’s business or parliamentary business). But see also BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 778 (8th ed. 2004) (defining income); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 906 (4th ed.
1968); supra note 84 (explaining that business, as used in a noncommercial sense, negates
the concept of income as one of gain, earnings, or profit).
101
26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(3) (2002); see also supra text accompanying note 96. Logically, there
can be no gain when the measure of damages is the amount of money necessary to make
the victim whole again. This is especially true when recoveries for emotional distress
damages are not rendered in lieu of something that is otherwise taxable because emotional
well-being, the lack of emotional distress, is not taxable as income. Hubbard, supra note 69,
at 761.
102
See Part III.A–C, IV.F; see also O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 84 (“At that time, this Court had
recently decided several cases based on the principle that a restoration of capital was not
income; hence it fell outside the definition of ‘income’ upon which the law imposed a
tax.”); Doti, supra note 77, at 62 ( “Congress should have eliminated the section 104(a)(2)
exclusion for lost wages and earning power in all cases . . . . Uncertainty and resulting
litigation will continue until Congress limits the exclusion to damages attributable solely to
losses of human capital.”). Gain or income is defined broadly to be an increase in wealth,
clearly realized, over which the taxpayer has control, but a recovery that just repairs or
reimburses for the loss suffered and merely substitutes for goods of a nontaxable nature,
such as pleasure or pain, is not gain or income. See also Hubbard, supra note 69, at 760
(“Even if it were proper to treat payments of compensatory awards as taxable transactions,
there would be serious equal treatment problems with an excise imposed only on awards
for mental distress unaccompanied by a physical injury and imposed at a rate which varies
with the taxpayer’s overall income.”); Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, Discrimination Against
Damages for Unlawful Discrimination: The Supreme Court, Congress, and the Income Tax, 35
98
99
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F. An Emotional Distress Recovery Is Not an Income Item Using the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Analysis
Even if an emotional distress recovery tax is a capitation or direct tax
that is not apportioned, this tax could still be considered constitutional if
the emotional distress recovery is income in the constitutional sense.103
This author contends that what Congress did in the 1996 Act, by making
an emotional distress recovery taxable in a nonphysical personal injury,
was to declare that an emotional distress recovery is income in a
statutory sense. This declaration occurred in two instances: when
Congress stated in § 104(a)(2) that emotional distress shall not be treated
as a physical personal injury or physical sickness, and when Congress
stated in legislative history that an exclusion from gross income does not
apply to any damages received on a claim of employment discrimination
or injury to reputation accompanied by a claim of emotional distress.
However, these statements do not give Congress the power to make
emotional distress recoveries an item of taxable income in the
constitutional sense. Thus, even if an emotional distress recovery may be
defined to be income in the statutory sense, the tax on emotional distress
recoveries is unconstitutional as long as the emotional distress recovery
is not income in the constitutional sense.104
Section 61(a)’s legislative history sets forth the statutory meaning of
income, expressly subjecting the term income to a definition based on the
U.S. Constitution.105 Because the Sixteenth Amendment does not define
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 447, 449–50, 497 (1998) (“Under this so-called ‘in lieu of’ principle,
whether the harm is physical is irrelevant. Instead, in all personal injury cases, damages
for lost earnings should be taxable and damages for pain and suffering should be
excludable.”). But see Patrick E. Hobbs, The Personal Injury Exclusion: Congress Gets Physical
but Leaves the Exclusion Emotionally Distressed, 76 NEB. L. REV. 51, 56, 94 (1997) (advocating a
total repeal of the personal injury exclusion both in its physical and nonphysical aspects).
103
See Part IV.D; see also Comm’r v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 217 F.2d 56, 58 (1954) (“The
[Sixteenth] Amendment allows a tax on ‘income’ without apportionment, but an
unapportioned direct tax on anything that is not income would still, under the rule of the
Pollock case, be unconstitutional.”); Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 378
(1934) (holding that tax on the rental value of a building by its owner is a direct tax because
income is not involved); Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 481 (1929) (stating that the “Sixteenth
Amendment confers no power upon Congress to define and tax as income without
apportionment something which theretofore could not have been properly regarded as
income”); Edwards v. Cuba R.R., 268 U.S. 628, 631–32 (1925) (“The Sixteenth Amendment,
like other laws authorizing or imposing taxes, is to be taken as written and is not to be
extended beyond the meaning clearly indicated by the language used.”); Pollack II, 158 U.S.
601 (1895); Pollack I, 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Jensen, supra note 75, at 1147; Maule, supra note 5,
at A-13.
104
See Part IV.D; see also supra note 99 and accompanying text.
105
See Part II.A.
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the phrase “taxes on incomes” or indicate whether income means gross
income or net income,106 constitutional interpretation rules become the
focal point.
Constitutional interpretation generally includes a review of the text,
the framer’s intent, the underlying purpose of the Constitution, judicial
precedent, and consideration of justice and social policy.107 Originalists
view these items from the time of the Constitution’s adoption, and
nonoriginalists view these items as evolving concepts.108
In assessing the Constitution’s underlying purpose along with justice
and social policy, a basic sense of fairness evolved in constitutional
interpretation, as represented by the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses.109 The Equal Protection Clause, which provides that people in
similar situations ought to be treated similarly, is like the basic tax policy
of horizontal equity, which provides that people with similar incomes
ought to pay similar taxes.110
In Eisner v. Macomber,111 a definition of income in the constitutional
sense appeared under the 1916 Act, and the Court found that there must
be a gain before it is considered income in the constitutional sense.112 In
See Maule, supra note 5, at A-13.
Majorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of
Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1992).
108
Id. at 4.
109
See id. at 25–26.
110
Id.
111
252 U.S. 189 (1920).
112
Macomber, 252 U.S. at 206–07; Kornhauser, supra note 107, at 9-10. The Macomber Court
showed that the concept of income is not infinite. The Court stated:
A proper regard for [the Sixteenth Amendment] genesis, as well as its
very clear language, requires also that this Amendment shall not be
extended by loose construction, so as to repeal or modify, except as
applied to income, those provisions of the Constitution that require an
apportionment according to population for direct taxes upon property,
real and personal. This limitation still has an appropriate and
important function, and is not to be overridden by Congress or
disregarded by the courts. . . . [I]t becomes essential to distinguish
between what is and what is not “income”. . . . Congress cannot by
any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by
legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power
to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be
lawfully exercised.
Macomber, 252 U.S. at 206; see also Jensen, supra note 79, at 1144–45 (stating that while
Glenshaw Glass Co. found Macomber’s definition of income to be too narrow in deciding that
punitive damages were income even though they were not derived from labor or capital,
Macomber still remains viable if interpreted to mean that a tax imposed on capital rather
106
107
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Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka113 and Glenshaw Glass Co., this
concept of income was broadened by application of the Constitution’s
intent to ultimately define income as all “accessions to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”114
Even though the seminal judicial decisions of Macomber and Glenshaw
Glass Co. involved earlier versions of the statutory gross income
provisions of the 1913, 1918, and 1939 Acts, the Court has held that the
changes in the language from then until today do not change the
analysis.115
Because recoveries for personal injury were a statutory exclusion
from income from 1918 until 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet
addressed the issue of whether compensatory damages, such as
emotional distress recoveries, constitute income under the Sixteenth
Amendment.116 The two most recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court involving taxation of discrimination both focused on statutory
interpretation because the constitutional definition of income was not at
issue.117
The opinions in Burke, Schleier, and O’Gilvie reaffirm the exclusion of
emotional distress recoveries from income in a discrimination case or
other tort-type case under the pre-1996 exclusion from income statute.118
than gain from capital is not a tax on income because Macomber survives statutorily under
I.R.C. § 305(a) (2004) as to proportionate stock dividends). Macomber is still cited by the
Supreme Court. See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 563 (1991); Jensen, supra
note 75, at 709, 714 n.92.
113
255 U.S. 509 (1921).
114
Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955); see Smietanka, 255 U.S. at 520
(holding that capital gains are income); see also United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233
(1992); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219–20 (1961) (deciding that wrongful
appropriations are income in the year received); Kornhauser, supra note 107, at 15–16.
115
James, 366 U.S. at 219 (claiming the changes in language are technical rather than
substantive). This would also apply up until the present, as no significant changes were
made to § 61(a) in 1986 or through today. See Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166;
§ 213(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065; see also Maule, supra note 5, at A-13.
116
See Hubbard, supra note 69, at 741.
117
See Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 328 (1995) (emphasizing that the taxpayer
“concedes that his settlement constitutes gross income unless it is expressly excepted . . .”);
see also Burke, 504 U.S. at 233 (stating “[t]here is no dispute that the settlement awards in
this case would constitute gross income within the reach of [the statutory definition of
income]”); Hubbard, supra note 69, at 743.
118
See Burke, 504 U.S. at 239, 241. In Burke, the Court stated:
No doubt discrimination could constitute a “personal injury” for
purposes of § 104(a)(2) if the relevant cause of action evidenced a tortlike conception of injury and remedy. . . [such as] jury trials and for
awards of compensatory and punitive damages . . . [W]e believe that
Congress’ decision to permit jury trials and compensatory and
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In Burke and Schleier, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that the
intangible harms of discrimination are personal injuries.119 The Supreme
Court case O’Gilvie implies in dictum that “damages that aim to
substitute for a victim’s physical or personal well being—personal assets
that the Government does not tax and would not have taxed had the
victim not lost them” are not income under the principle that a
restoration of capital is not income.120 The dicta in these cases can be
used to predict that the U.S. Supreme Court would find an emotional
distress recovery not to be income in a discrimination case, negating the
need to address the recoveries under an exclusion from income statute.
V. OVERVIEW OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND TORT REFORM AS IT
PERTAINS TO PERSONAL INJURY REMEDIES
A. The Three-Way Tension
Since 1964, civil rights proponents have lobbied for broad
compensatory relief, especially for emotional distress, but the business
sector has lobbied against expansive compensatory relief due to the
damage done to their bottom line profit.121 With the tension between
civil rights and tort reform advocates and the added tension to preserve
the government fisc, a balance between social and economic forces
produced anti-discrimination statutes that offered inconsistent
remedies.122
B. Civil Rights Remedies
In 1964, the first generation of civil rights acts did not allow remedies
for intangible harms, such as emotional distress.123 The response was a
second generation set of laws that offered broad compensatory remedies,
punitive damages under the amended Act signals a marked change in
its conception of the injury redressable by Title VII . . . . “Monetary
damages also are necessary to make discrimination victims whole for
the terrible injury to their careers, to their mental and emotional health,
and to their self respect and dignity.”
Id. at 239–41, 239-41 n.12 (quoting, in part, H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 64–65 (1991),
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 602, 603); see also Schleier, 515 U.S. at 332 n.6 (“We of course
have no doubt that the intangible harms of discrimination can constitute personal injury,
and that compensation for such harms may be excludable under § 104(a)(2).”).
119
See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 332; Burke, 504 U.S. at 239.
120
See O’Gilvie v United States, 519 U.S. 79, 86 (1996).
121
See Gerald A. Madek, Tax Treatment of Damages Awarded for Age Discrimination, 12
AKRON TAX J. 161 (1996).
122
Id. at 161–62.
123
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2003) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also
Madek, supra note 121, at 161.
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including intangible harms such as emotional distress or liquidated
damages.124
The third generation of anti-discrimination laws provided for jury
trials and a broad range of compensatory relief, which included
emotional distress recoveries and punitive damages.125 To curb this new
wave of excludability from income, Congress stepped in to enact an
amended § 104(a)(2) in 1996 to tax nonphysical personal injuries and to
explicitly name discrimination claims as taxable, which includes the
emotional distress recovery component.126
C. Tort Reform Background
The civil rights era was also juxtaposed with massive tort reform at
both the federal and state levels.127 In the late 1960s, physician
malpractice insurance premiums increased in response to a purported
medical malpractice litigation crisis, which increased medical treatment
costs.128 In the 1970s, manufacturers’ insurance rates surged due to an
alleged overflow of products liability litigation.129
In the 1980s,
insurance companies refused to reissue policies to high-risk holders,
asserting a general tort crisis.130 By 1988, forty-eight states had
participated in tort reform; forty-eight percent of these states imposing
caps on the amounts recoverable, fifty-two percent attacking either the
availability or amount of punitive damages, and twenty-one percent
placing limits on noneconomic damages.131
The 1996 amendment to § 104(a)(2) came right during “this backdrop
of developing congressional civil rights and tort reform legislation.”132
“Congressional statements that ‘substantial litigation’ has occurred
42 U.S.C. §§ 3610–14 (1988). Section 3613(c) indicates that Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 fair housing remedies are tort-like with jury trials and compensatory and
punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (1988); see also The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (1999) (offering back pay and liquidated damages);
Madek, supra note 121, at 171, 176 (asserting that liquidated damages often went undefined
and thus could be labeled as either compensatory or punitive).
125
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1992); see
also Madek, supra note 121, at 179–80.
126
See § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838, 1928–29; H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300–02 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1792–94.
127
See Wolff, supra note 57, at 1429.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 1429–30.
131
Id. at 1430–31.
132
Id. at 1434.
124
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concerning cases not involving physical injury or physical sickness and
that ‘taxation . . . should not depend on the type of claim made,’ clearly
evidence legislative back door tort reform.”133
D. The Sexual Stereotypes of Emotional Distress Injury Must Be Dispelled
The forerunners of tort law were Trespass and Trespass on the
Case.134 In 1773, the distinction was made between whether the
defendant intended or carelessly caused the harm. Trespass signified
instances where the defendant directly caused the injuries to the
plaintiff, and Trespass on the Case signified instances where the
defendant indirectly caused the injury to the plaintiff.135 Thus, the
ancestor of negligence was the action of Trespass on the Case, “where
the matter affected was not tangible or the injury was not immediate but
consequential.”136
The English tort law then adopted the reasonable man standard in
negligence actions,137 which made the objective standard genderbiased.138 At the time, nineteenth century England regarded women as
emotional beings who were property and disenfranchised.139
Thus, injury to emotions did not seem to constitute harm to the
reasonable man.140 This was seen most prominently in the early
emotional distress decision of Lynch v. Knight.141 The Lynch case
involved a defamation action, where Lord Wensleydale held that a
husband suffers a monetary loss as a result of the loss of consortium of
his wife, but that the wife suffers only emotional and mental injury from
the loss of consortium of her husband.142 While this material/emotional
133
Id. at 1437 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 142–44 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1755, 1838–39); see Hubbard, supra note 69, at 745 (claiming that the
reason why Congress limited this exclusion to physical personal injuries and physical
sickness was not expressly stated in the Committee Reports, but speculation is that it was
used as a tool for tort reform); see also Robert Cate Illig, Tort Reform and the Tax Code: An
Opportunity To Narrow the Personal Injuries Exemption, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1459, 1461 (1995)
(discussing the exclusion from 1918–1995).
134
See Patrick Kelley, Infancy, Insanity, and Infirmity in the Law of Torts, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 179,
181 (2003).
135
Scott v. Shepherd, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773).
136
1 AM. JUR. 2D Actions § 23 (2003).
137
Vaughn v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492 (1837); see also Wolff, supra note 57, at 1471.
138
See Wolff, supra note 57, at 1471.
139
Id. at 1476–77.
140
Id.
141
See generally Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861) (displaying the English
Common Law sexual stereotypes).
142
Id.
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dichotomy has been overturned by medical research that demonstrates
that emotional and physical pain are not quantitatively different, victims
of dignitary torts, such as discrimination, may still be stereotyped as
weak and their emotional distress claims stereotyped as trivial.143
This reasonable man gender bias may also be seen today in the
intentional infliction of emotional distress cases.144 In these cases, states
often require the presence of physical illness or physical consequences,
that the plaintiff must be placed in physical danger by the defendant’s
conduct, or that the plaintiff must show serious mental distress.145
The emotional distress from the loss of dignity or other intangible
harm in a nonphysical personal injury is as economically and socially
important as physical personal injury, which now enjoys tax relief.146
Reinstating nonphysical personal injury to a tax status equal to physical
personal injury would again remove the reasonable man gender bias of
the English common law concerning emotional distress.
The last vestiges of following the sexual stereotypes of the English
common law system in our taxation of emotional distress recoveries
need to be severed. Our U.S. Constitution, the tax doctrines found in
reparation rights tax relief, and our U.S. Supreme Court cases require the
conclusion that emotional distress recoveries are not income147 because
these recoveries are a return of human capital,148 a mere restoration of
civil or personal rights,149 fall under the “in lieu of” test,150 or fall under
horizontal equity.151

Wolff, supra note 57, at 1479–80.
Id. at 1473; see also J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Getting Physical: Excluding
Personal Injury Awards Under the New Section 104(a)(2), 58 MONT. L. REV. 167, 184 (1997)
(suggesting that the 1996 change to include in taxable income nonphysical personal injury
recoveries was due to a fundamental distrust in the reality of emotional distress, or was
done to establish a bright-line test for administrative convenience). Few tort reform
proposals advocate eliminating emotional distress damages for intentional torts such as
assault. However, most proposals criticize authorization of emotional distress damages
where the claim is based primarily on negligence or strict liability torts. Thus, singling out
nonphysical personal injuries as the avenue for tort reform is inconsistent with virtually all
tort reform proposals. Hubbard, supra note 69, at 766 n.111.
145
Wolff, supra note 57, at 1474.
146
Id. at 1344.
147
See supra Parts III.A–C, IV.F.
148
See supra Part III.A.
149
See supra Part III.B.
150
See supra Part III.C.
151
See supra Part IV.F.
143
144
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E. Dispelling the Sexual Stereotypes of Emotional Distress Injury Fosters Our
Tort Reform and Civil Rights Movement
Several commentators have remarked that taxable awards in
discrimination cases have hindered the tort reform advocates’ goal of
limiting awards and claims.152 One commentator suggests that the
taxability of awards in discrimination cases will prompt these
discrimination claimants to seek higher monetary settlements to secure a
fair settlement after taxation, with the employers bearing that increased
cost.153 Another commentator contends that the 1996 amendment taxing
nonphysical personal injury cases will result in fewer negotiated
settlements in employment discrimination and dignitary tort cases,
causing more rather than less trials.154 Yet another commentator
postulates that jurors, knowing that these awards are taxable, will
provide higher litigation awards, which in turn will lead to higher
insurance premiums.155 Finally, this author shows how the taxability of
emotional distress recoveries in nonphysical personal injuries, such as
discrimination cases, will cause litigation on constitutional grounds.
On the other hand, the proposed resurrection of the dual and equal
exclusion for emotional distress recoveries in both physical and
nonphysical personal injury and sickness claims dispels the sexual
stereotypes from the English common law and allows emotional distress
recoveries in nonphysical personal injury claims to be as economically or
socially important as in physical personal injury claims.156 This will also
reinstate an equal protection of laws to ensure that emotional distress
recoveries in nonphysical personal injury claims are treated as equal to
physical personal injury claims.
Under the amended § 104(a)(2), emotional distress recoveries in
nonphysical personal injuries are now taxable and therefore must be
regarded as economic damages to sustain their taxability as income.
However, under proposed federal tort reform, emotional distress

152
Carole N. Roche, Recent Developement: Commissioner v. Schleier: Monetary Awards
Resulting from Claims of Discrimination Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (“ADEA”) Are Not Excludable From Gross Income for Purposes of Income Taxation, 26 U.
BALT. L.F. 43, 45 (1995); see also Burke & Friel, supra note 144, at 188; John W. Dostert,
Commissioner v. Schleier: Adding Insult to “Personal Injury?”, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1641, 1679,
1679 n.265 (1996).
153
See Roche, supra note 152, at 45.
154
See Burke & Friel, supra note 144, at 188.
155
See Dostert, supra note 152, at 1679 n.265.
156
See supra Part V.D.
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recoveries are regarded as noneconomic damages.157 Persons who are
entitled to such recoveries now have these recoveries taxed as economic
damages in nonphysical personal injuries even when tort reformers
propose to limit emotional distress recoveries in medical malpractice
cases as noneconomic damages. This inconsistency, defining emotional
distress recoveries as economic damages for the purpose of taxation and
then defining emotional distress recoveries as noneconomic damages for
the purpose of limiting awards by tort reformers, cannot continue.
VI. CONCLUSION
As analyzed in Part III, the administrative history of personal injury
rights and reparation rights recoveries provides precedent
demonstrating that emotional distress recoveries are not income items.
Thus, the use of the specific statutory exclusion from income, as
discussed in Part II, is not necessary. This is because these recoveries
have been held not to be income, as they constitute return of human
capital or reimbursement for the loss of personal or civil rights.
The administrative history is based on court precedent. This court
precedent, as illustrated in Part IV, is also founded upon the U.S.
Constitution using rules of constitutional interpretation.
There appears to be no U.S. Supreme Court precedent that has
reviewed the authority of Congress to define emotional distress
recoveries as an income item in the constitutional sense or to tax
emotional distress recoveries without apportionment. The dicta in Burke,
Schleier, and O’Gilvie reaffirms that emotional distress recoveries are not
income under the tax doctrines of the return of human capital, the
reimbursement for the loss of personal or civil rights, or the “in lieu of”
test. If emotional distress recoveries are not an income item in the
constitutional sense, then Congress has no constitutional ability to place
them in a taxable income category by statute or to tax them without
apportionment.
In Part V, the resurrection of the dual and equal exclusion for
emotional distress recoveries in both physical and nonphysical personal
injury claims dispels the final vestiges of the sexual stereotypes found in
the English common law. Further, the resurrection allows emotional
distress recoveries in nonphysical personal injury claims to be as
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N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 512 nn.9, 22 (2005).
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economically and socially important as physical personal injury
recoveries.
This resurrection also stops the inconsistent treatment of emotional
distress recoveries, where tort reformers label these recoveries as
noneconomic damages while Congress taxes these same recoveries
under the guise of economic damages. The interests of human rights’
and civil rights’ advocates as well as the tort reformers can be merged by
allowing a statutory exclusion for emotional distress recoveries in all
personal injury and sickness claims.158
This in turn will avoid litigation challenging the constitutionality of
taxing emotional distress recoveries as an item of income. It will also
avoid litigation challenging the taxation of emotional distress recoveries
as a violation of the tax policy of horizontal equity, which is comparable
to a violation of equal protection by failing to tax those similarly situated
in a similar fashion.
Do Americans have the moral authority to punish international
oppressors and terrorists that deny human rights and civil rights without
affirming America’s own commitment to civil rights? If the answer is no,
then the solution requires reinstating the statutory, judicial, and
administrative tax relief exclusions for emotional distress recoveries in
nonphysical personal injury and sickness claims that existed in the
United States from 1918–1996.

158
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promote its own self-interests”).
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